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Against the Received Wisdom: Why Should the Criminal Justice System Give Kids a Break?
Stephen J. Morse

Introduction
Here is the opening of the summary of an amicus brief in Roper v. Simmons,
the 2005 United States Supreme Court decision holding the death penalty
unconstitutional for all juvenile offenders. It was filed by, inter alia, the American
Medical Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the American
Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, and the American Academy of
Psychiatry and the Law:
“The adolescent’s mind works differently from ours. Parents know it. This
Court [the United States Supreme Court] has said it. Legislatures have
presumed it for decades or more.”1
As if to confirm this blinding insight, Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent in Miller v.
Alabama, the case that found mandatory life imprisonment for juvenile offenders
who had committed homicide crimes unconstitutional, said, “…teenagers are less
mature, less responsible and less fixed in their ways than adults—not that a
Supreme Court case was needed to establish that.”2
Precisely. The common law of immaturity in a wide variety of criminal and
civil contexts and the establishment of a juvenile court system in the 19 th C.
confirm that the law has long responded to the psychological differences between
juveniles and adults. Indeed, Roman law instantiated the difference and the
English common law of infancy has its roots in the 14th C.3 The age of majority
has varied from time to time. In the mature common law of criminal
responsibility, kids younger than 7 were conclusively presumed to be not
responsible, kids4 7-13 were rebuttably presumed not responsible, and kids 14 and
older were presumed responsible. Today, the dividing line in the United States for
most purposes is 18 and varies for criminal responsibility; in English law, the age
of criminal responsibility is 12. But the important culpability and competence
differences between those older and younger than the dividing line were always
assumed.
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It was equally and always assumed, implicitly or explicitly, that those
differences and the differential legal treatment that followed were based on
differences in the capacities of the two groups, such as the alleged greater average
impulsiveness of kids, which could vary according to the context. Committing a
serious crime and deciding whether to have an abortion are different behaviors that
seem to require different capacities for responsibility. Differences may be more
important for some legal categories than for others. Age is allegedly a good but
imperfect proxy for these differences. Virtually all important juvenile law
scholars, such as David Brink, Barry Feld, Elizabeth Scott, Laurence Steinberg,
Franklin Zimring, and a host of others agree. This was, and still is, the received
wisdom.5 Let us refer to this as The Received Wisdom [TRW], recognizing that it
may have different forms. TRW has been substantially bolstered in recent years by
increasingly sophisticated behavioral science that confirms substantial behavioral
differences on average between adults and adolescents, many of which are relevant
to classic responsibility criteria such as rationality broadly conceived, and by
neuroimaging studies demonstrating that the brain’s anatomical maturation does
not end at any of the usual legal dividing lines but continues into the mid-20s.
Arguing against TRW, Gideon Yaffe’s The Age of Culpability [AC], an
immensely rigorous account of why kids should be given a break for criminal
responsibility, suggests that everyone else has provided the wrong rationale for
differential criminal justice treatment. TRW is so entrenched that, to the best of
my knowledge, AC is the only serious counterargument ever offered for giving
kids a break. According to AC, the reason kids deserve a break does not depend
on different capacities, but instead is better justified on the basis that kids generally
have much less say about the legal criteria for criminal responsibility, primarily
because they do not have the right to vote. AC argues that kids should be given a
break because Yaffe’s reason-responsive view of criminal responsibility entails
that they have fewer legal reasons to obey than adults and are therefore less
culpable. AC argues that age has political meaning rather than significance
because it betokens capacity differences.
This creative and intricately argued volume has many interesting chapters
that deploy original and nuanced arguments that develop AC’s theory of
responsibility, especially the chapters on culpability and desert. These are
challenging and interesting in themselves and less (but still quite) controversial
5
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than the argument about giving kids a break. They should be read by all those
interested in criminal culpability generally. I suspect that this wider theory of
responsibility is AC’s major quarry and deserves its own review. Nonetheless, the
general theory is nominally in aid of the volume’s basic goal of re-orienting how
we should think about giving kids a break. Because the primary goal is re-thinking
why kids deserve a break, this essay will therefore focus on that question.
The question for criminal law theorists is whether TRW or AC’s rationale is
a better positive explanation and more normatively desirable. AC’s argument is a
labyrinthinely complicated. Occam’s razor is dulled with every stroke. It is so
densely argued that a review that does it justice would be as long as the book, and
perhaps longer. This is unsurprising when one is seeking to upend the legal,
scholarly and commonsense wisdom (or lack of it) of millennia by philosophical
argument rather than by empirical disproof. A great deal of heavy lifting will be
necessary. By itself, the intricacy of the necessary argumentation and the hoary
countervailing history do not mean that AC is wrong. But it clearly has the burden
of persuasion on historical and methodological grounds. In this case, I am not
persuaded: TRW is a better fit to the data and furnishes a more appealing ground
for giving kids a break than lack of say over the criminal law. TRW holds that the
law gives kids less say because on average they are less rational and experienced
than adults. Indeed, that is the response that virtually all people have when hearing
AC’s argument.
AC rightly and usefully notes that there are three independent positive
arguments for treating kids differently: age is a proxy for diminished culpability,
kid will be kids, and kids will grow out of it. It also correctly observes that some
advocates for TRW conflate the three. Nevertheless, the proxy argument is the
most common and important position. After addressing a few preliminary issues, I
therefore discuss AC’s negative argument against the validity of TRW, focusing on
the diminished culpability claim, especially because the structure of the negative
argument against the other two is structurally similar and because it is unclear that
kids will be kids is a genuinely independent argument. If the negative case against
TRW fails, then the only issue is whether AC’s alternative is desirable. I conclude
by offering what I think is a benignly definitional argument that survives the
negative argument and supports giving kids a break in the exceedingly unlikely
event that the empirical assumptions of TRW are proven incorrect. Throughout,
my primary goal is not to take issue with AC, although it will seem that way, but to
3

offer what I hope are helpful thoughts about how kids should be treated in the
criminal justice system.
Preliminaries
AC’s argument is ahistorical. As the Introduction noted, kids have been
treated differently from adults in civil and criminal law going back to Roman law.
The difference in contractual obligations is a primary example. The explanation is
virtually always that kids have lesser capacities than adults. To continue the
example of contracts, kids are more likely to have bad judgment and to be more
easily taken advantage of because they are less rational. It is highly unlikely that
kids may avoid their contracts in most instances because they have little say over
contract law. It is of course possible that criminal liability is distinguishable from
civil duties and protections, but where the law seems uniform in differential
treatment and for uniform reasons—to wit, some version of TRW—drawing that
distinction would have strengthened AC’s case.
It is important to clarify a point that advocates for kids who base their
arguments on TRW often confuse. Finding an average psychological or biological
difference between kids and adults, even a big one, does not entail different legal
treatment. First, the difference must be relevant to the issue at hand, criminal
responsibility in this case. Second, even if the difference is relevant, it must be
sufficiently large normatively to justify differential legal treatment. The most
egregious example of the first problem is the belief that neuroanatomical
maturation differences between adolescents and adults entail lesser responsibility
for the former. Neuroanatomical maturation is not a relevant responsibility
characteristic, however. The criteria for responsibility are behavioral, namely acts
and mental states. The claim based on neuroanatomy is a category error. AC
scrupulously and correctly does not make this mistake. It says that neural facts, if
they matter at all, only do so if they underlie a psychological state or capacity that
does matter.6 An example of the second is impulsivity. The Supreme Court and
many others seem to think that impulsivity diminishes responsibility, but it is not a
defense to crime and it would not be a standard mitigating factor in adult
sentencing. Consequently, there seems to be a relevance problem. But let’s
assume that the Supreme Court is right. In that case, is the average impulsivity
difference between adolescents and adults large enough to justify lesser criminal
responsibility for adolescents as a class? Maybe or maybe not, depending on what
6
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the legislature or the courts believe is the minimum for full responsibility. Even if
TRW is the best justification for treating kids differently, these two issues must be
faced forthrightly without begging the question.
AC addresses the proxy argument with a clarifying analysis of the costs and
benefits of any legal scheme that is perhaps the most penetrating that I have read. It
correctly recognizes, as all sensible TRW advocates concede, that the behavioral
characteristics that are relevant to responsibility will be both over-inclusive and
under-inclusive no matter where we draw the dividing line, at least among
adolescents. Some kids below the line will have the relevant responsibility
characteristics and some adults over it will not, raising the possibility of true and
false positives and negatives in decision-making. AC cautions that any adequate
policy analysis must therefore include a full assessment of all the true and false
positives and negatives and cannot simply focus on the virtues of the true positives,
as AC accuses the Supreme Court of doing in Miller. Where, given our values, the
age line should be drawn in any legal context, such as criminal responsibility, will
depend on the full costs and benefits. Nevertheless, because no proxy is perfect,
there will be undoubted costs wherever the line is drawn. We should recognize
that no legislature will be perfectly able to do that full accounting. After holding
hearings and presumably listening to experts as well as pressure groups, the
legislature will be flying by the empirical seat of its pants. Among “equally
implementable” alternatives, to use AC’s phrase—and in this instance the age lines
are all equally implementable--we can never be absolutely sure which is the best,
nor should we expect such certainty. As Bismarck observed, watching legislation
and sausage being made are very similar endeavors. Neither is much like
developing armchair theory.
Before turning to AC’s substantive criticism of the proxy argument, it is
important to recognize what a false positive means in juvenile cases and its
systemic effects. A psychologically mature minor who does not really deserve a
break according to TRW will get one, but that does not mean the juvenile goes scot
free. Instead the juvenile will receive diminished blame and punishment, but he or
she will still be punished and often substantially for serious crimes. Thus,
retribution, deterrence and incapacitation in appropriate cases will be served, albeit
not as fully as if the kid did not get a break. But how much marginal retribution,
deterrence and incapacitation will be lost with such false positives? I do not know
the answer and neither does anyone else, but would it be so objectionable if some
5

young people were not subjected to the full deserved afflictive imposition of state
blame and punishment?
The Negative Argument Against TRW
AC’s negative argument, which it terms the “empirical dependence” claim,
starts with an intuition Professor Yaffe believes is widely shared: even if the best
behavioral science were to indicate unquestionably that there were no substantial
responsibility-relevant differences between kids and adults or even if there were an
equally implementable policy with a better mix of gains and losses that would not
give all kids a break, we would still want to give all kids below the age cut-off line
a break. AC concedes that a “no differences” finding is exceedingly unlikely
scientifically; indeed the increasing accumulation of scientific information
continues to confirm the differences. But if it turned out to be true, it would make
no difference. We would still want to give all kids a break. AC confidently asserts
that the proxy for culpability argument therefore must be false and that the true
ground for categorically giving kids a break is to be found in some other rationale.
With respect, I do not share that intuition, nor did all but one of the students
in my “Freedom and Responsibility” seminar with upper division Penn Law
students. What AC terms “our implicit and unarticulated rational for giving kids a
break”7 is perhaps not nearly as widely-shared at AC believes and empirical
dependence is not nearly as problematic as it avers. Average capacity differences
are not a metaphysical or conceptual truth about kids of any age. They are
empirically grounded and could turn out to vanish upon further investigation. (If
they did, would you believe the studies or your lying eyes?) As a practical matter,
however, differential capacity is not contingent although in principle, as AC rightly
argues, it is. It is a safe prediction that these differences will endure empirically,
so perhaps it’s too easy to claim that I would stop giving all kids a break because I
know I will never have to face the possibility. But I do not think that is true for a
reason prompted by the second pillar of AC’s intuition: that we would not give up
on giving kids a categorical break even if there were an equally implementable
policy that had a better mix of losses and gains. I think such a policy already exists,
however, individuation, and I would adopt it. I will discuss it in the last section
below, but under this policy some but not all kids would get a break.
But for those who accept TRW and want to give all kids a break, will AC
force them to concede that the proxy for culpability ground fails? I think not. AC
7
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begins by hypothesizing a not completely hypothetical scheme by which all boys
under the age of 18 get a break, but girls only get a break if they are under 16 on
the ground that girls mature faster and therefore do not differ from adults at an
earlier age than boys. AC concedes that no one knows if, all things considered,
this scheme would be preferable in gains and losses to a gender-neutral scheme,
but also concedes that it might well be better and says that if it is, TRW adherents
should accept it. AC assumes that most people would nevertheless recoil from this
scheme, but if they do, it claims, they should reject the proxy argument or at least
demand that it be supplemented. After all, the state should not be inflicting blame
and punishment according to some proxy if there is a superior proxy. Gender is of
course a controversial variable to use to improve the proxy argument, but it may be
the most useful if one is aiming for accuracy and efficiency in identifying those
kids who deserve a break. AC gives other similar examples,8 but let us use the
gender example because the argument structure is similar to the others. That is, it
seeks to identify every possible argument that might support the proxy for
diminished culpability and then demonstrate that it cannot be right.
AC notes that attachment to giving all kids a break might be irrational if a
superior proxy were found, but tries to determine if qualms about the gender-based
classification might be both rational and consistent with the proxy argument. In
another words, like the excellent philosopher that he is, Professor Yaffe puts
maximum pressure on his own argument. For example, appealing to more general
bad consequences of a policy, such as discriminating against women leading to the
perpetuation of negative stereotypes, misses the point. Consequences are not all
that matters to criminal liability: desert is crucial. The aversion to a gendersensitive classification for criminal liability cannot be properly based on this
ground if gender is superior for ascribing blame and punishment. Another
possibility is that gender-based classification would unequally distribute benefits
and burdens. But, as AC points out, even giving all kids a break does that because
8
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those defendants who are adults are apportioned heavier burdens than kids, and our
society believes that is just because there is a genuine moral difference between
adults and kids. It follows that if gender classification is superior, then there is a
moral justification for the gender inequality that is as sound as the adult/youth
inequality. Just blame and punishment are essential government functions, AC
rightly notes, and doing it better should lead us to adopt the superior policy of
gender-sensitivity. AC completes its gender discussion by asking whether there is
an exclusionary reason not to adopt the gender-sensitive classification if it is more
accurate and suggests that if there is, that is why we must recoil from this type of
scheme. It concludes that there is not such a reason because there are permissible
contexts for gender-specific policies, such as TSA employees who must pat down
passengers and because oppression based on gender is not a feature of criminal
punishment.
After showing why the objections to the gender proxy can be defeated, AC
says this:
…my point is not that all this shows the we ought not to give breaks to girls
between the ages of 16 and 18. Far from it. I think the gender sensitive policy
should be laughed out of contention. My point is that the advocate of the
Proxy for Culpability argument cannot laugh at it, but must instead entertain
the serious possibility that it is more justified by the standards informing the
Proxy for Culpability argument in the first place. This is an objection to the
Proxy for Culpability argument because the gender-sensitive policy is
unjustified even it if offers superior classification than the policy of giving all
kids a break regardless of gender.9
With respect, I do not think that gender classifications for purposes of ascribing
blame and punishment are necessarily laughable, but instead are sometimes
plausible. Consider Section 54 of the English Coroners and Justice Act that
Parliament passed in 2009 and went into effect in 2010,10 which replaced the
traditional provocation/passion doctrine for reducing an intentional homicide from
murder to manslaughter with a new “loss of control” mitigation. If there is a
“qualifying trigger” for the loss of control, a broader doctrine than traditional
provocation, the question is what degree of control can be expected of the
defendant. Subsection1(c) answers that question as follows: “(c) a person of D’s
9
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sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in the
circumstances of D, might have reacted in the same or in a similar way to D.
[emphasis supplied]”.11 In other words, English law assumes, perhaps incorrectly
but perhaps correctly, that sex is morally relevant to the degree of self-control to
expect of ordinary people because it affects morally relevant categories. Further,
with respect, the final conclusion that the gender-based policy is unjustified even if
superior, is simply an ipse dixit based on the potentially incorrect assumption that
we think all kids should be an equal break.
AC’s assumption that we all want to give all kids a break is simply an
assertion not backed by evidence and there is counter-evidence. I do not think the
proxy for culpability argument has been decisively refuted.
The AC Rationale for Giving All Kids a Break
AC says that the thesis of the book can be summarized by a slogan: “Kids
ought to be given a break because they are disenfranchised.”12 The positive
argument can be summarized as follows. Kids have little say over the content of
criminal law because they cannot vote, although they can influence the law by
speech (if their parents or other controlling institutions allow them to). Therefore,
when deciding whether to violate a criminal law, they have less reason than adults
to recognize, weigh and respond to the legal reasons not to offend, even if the
offense is a clear moral violation.13 As people who can influence the law, adults
are complicit in giving themselves legal reasons to obey and in the state’s
treatment of them if they offend. Because kids are not so complicit, they have
fewer supporting reasons to obey. As a result of the absence of legal reasons, kids
are less culpable and deserve a corresponding break.
On average kids have much less say or potential say about the law than
adults. Of course there are many adults who have little say, and some kids who
may have substantial say because they are the children of legislators or because
they become involved in a public controversy, such as the issues of gun control in
the wake of school shootings or of climate change. But kids cannot vote, full stop,
and adults can. Moreover, parents have significant authority over how much their
children can speak. If culpability differences depend in large measure on how
11
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much say kids have compared to adults, the culpability differences and the breaks
owed must be very large. The assessment of culpability differences and the breaks
given in our system are not so large, however. For example, after Miller, kids
convicted of homicide crimes can be sentenced to life without the possibility of
parole although such a sentence may not be mandatory. AC does argue that, all
things being equal, mitigation is always appropriate,14 but perhaps the force of
AC’s argument is that the breaks should be much larger than they now are. After
all, as every criminal lawyer knows, the more important question for most
defendants is not whether they will be convicted, but if they will go inside, and if
so, for how long. The size of breaks matters a lot and deserved more attention in
AC.
The last paragraph began with the empirical assertion AC adopts that kids
have less say about the law. This is not a conceptual truth and thus it itself raises
AC’s empirical dependence concern. Suppose we had some measure that
operationalized a consensual meaning of “having a say.” In that case, we would
have a continuum comparison between kids and adults that could range from kids
having lots more say by the influence of their speech to kids having essentially no
say. As AC discusses, voting is not the only way to have say, although it is very
important. I recognize that the two extreme positions are about as empirically
likely as there being no differences in responsibility characteristics between kids
and adults, but AC would have to concede it is a possibility and should consider
what follows, but does not. Consider the possibilities. If kids have no say at all,
then are they culpable at all? If the answer is affirmative, then the
disenfranchisement account cannot possibly be doing all the work for why kids
should be given a break. It at least must be supplementing TRW or something
else. The reverse is also true. If kids have lot more say, they are more culpable on
that ground than adults. If AC still wants to give kids a break, the enhanced
culpability resulting from say must be swamped by some other variable that
reduces’ kids’ culpability. Once again, the variable must be TRW or something
like it. At the least, even if AC’s disenfranchisement account is plausible, it needs
supplementation.
The question is why disenfranchisement reduces culpability? What further
reason does the law provides beyond the moral reasons not to do wrong? Juveniles
are not prosecuted for regulatory, malum prohibitum crimes. They are prosecuted
for acts that are at the core of the criminal law: force, fraud and theft in the absence
14

AC, p. 204.

10

of a compelling justification, which are clearly moral wrong as any ordinary kid
knows. Of course, there cannot be criminal blame and punishment if there is no
violation of a legal prohibition, and even at the core, law and morality can come
apart, although seldom. The state can only impose a legal punishment for a
criminal law violation, and kids don’t have a say in what those punishments are.
Nonetheless, starkly immoral behavior like homicide, aggravated assault, sexual
assault, and robbery would be prohibited no matter who did or did not have a say
in the content of the core of the criminal law. Moreover, the threat of a
punishment is alone a very weak normative reason not to offend among those who
manifest proper “modes oftransaction with reasons” (AC’s somewhat ungainly
terminology) compared to those underlying the claim that an action is morally
wrong.
Even a kid understands what a punishment is, but because they have less
maturity, less rationality and less life experience, they may not fully and properly
weigh the moral reasons not to offend. If this is correct, then it lends support to the
proxy for culpability argument rather than the disenfranchisement position. Kids
are less culpable because they, or at least some of them, have diminished
responsibility characteristics.
A crucial step in AC’s argument is to explain why kids are not entitled to
vote, why they don’t have a say. Suppose for example that the voting age were
lowered to 14. Would we now think 14-year olds do not deserve a break? AC’s
basic answer is that we do need an age of majority for voting to permit parents to
influence the future course of the law by doing their best to pass on their values
that kids will promote when they are adults and can vote. The age of majority is
when we assume that kids can now be trusted to exercise judgment independent of
their parents despite being influenced by their parents.
As always, AC has careful, detailed arguments about this position, but it
hardly seems parsimonious or even plausible as an account of why kids don’t have
a say. There is merit in the point about people needing to pass on their values to
influence the future course of the law and to bind themseves to the continuous
polity in that way. Nevertheless, the more fundamental, common sense reason for
parental control is that kids need guidance as they develop because they do not
possess the rationality and experience to be sufficiently self-directive. Parents
have always had control over their kids and tried to inculcate their values, even in
polities that did not grant the vote to the parents either. Parents in such polities had
no motivation to influence the course of the law, but inculcated values nonetheless.
11

The less developed capacities of most kids and the lack of experience of all
kids are also more convincing reasons why they cannot vote until they have gained
sufficient rationality and experience.15 Roman and common law and general
parental practice grants kids increasing responsibility and holds them increasingly
responsible as they grow older not because they are closer to having a full say the
closer they get to the age of majority, but because their capacities for rational selfdirection increase. Once more, a diminished rationality or responsibility argument
seems a simpler and more plausible explanation for the differential treatment of
kids better than competing theories.
The Virtues of TRW
This section first provides a brief general defense of TRW on the grounds of
coherence and simplicity. Then it suggests a version of TRW that would guarantee
a break to all kids that would not be subject to the empirical dependence argument.
Because I am untroubled by that argument and by not giving all kids a break, I
offer this version of TRW as a friendly amendment and not as a last ditch effort to
save TRW. Finally, I offer another version of TRW that is also not subject to
empirical dependence but also does not give all kids a break.
Perhaps the greatest virtue of TRW is that it provides a satisfying and
simple, coherent account that ties together sensibly all the different legal contexts
in which kids are treated differently by the law. It fits the data not only of the
criminal law of juveniles, but of virtually any doctrine that treats kids differently.
It is possible, of course, that criminal culpability is distinguishable from all other
doctrines, but doing so would require yet another intricate argument. This does not
mean that the age of responsibility must be the same across all contexts. For
example, I consider the imposition of state blame and punishment such a grave
imposition that I would happily raise the age of full responsibility even if kids
could vote or make other independent decisions at an earlier age.
The clear intuition is that kids are treated differently because they have
different behavioral capacities. AC is correct, however, that the proper task of the
theoretician is to furnish a good argument to justify the intuition by showing that
the intuition is a rational conclusion to the premises.16 Any set of arguments will
be open to counterarguments, but as long as the argument itself seems a good one
and leads to a sensible result, it will stand until decisively refuted. In the spirit of
15
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AC, I wish to offer a TRW argument that conforms to AC’s intuition that all kids
should get a break when charged and convicted of crime.
The major premise in the argument is that legally different treatment of
classes of people concerning responsibility and competence in both criminal law
and civil law depend upon relevant differences in behavioral capacities. Here are
some classic examples. Some people with major mental disorder are excused from
criminal responsibility, are legally insane, because their cognitive or selfregulation capacities are severely impaired at the time of the crime (this includes
minors who face criminal charges). A defendant is incompetent to stand criminal
trial if the defendant cannot understand the nature of the charges and proceedings
or cannot rationally assist counsel. A person may be involuntarily civilly
committed as a mentally abnormal sexually violent predator if the person has
serious difficulty controlling his sexual offending. A person is incompetent to
contract if the person lacks the capacity to understand the meaning and the effects
of the words making up the transaction or contract, in other words, he lacks the
capacity to know what he is doing. To make a valid will, the person must know the
nature/extent of their property, the natural objects of the property, the disposition
that the will is making, and must have the ability to connect these elements to form
a coherent plan. It is important to recognize, however, that in virtually all cases,
the relevant decision will be individualized and not based on membership in a
class. Minors are an exception in competence to contract. Except in exceptional
circumstances, they can always avoid a contract because they lack understanding.17
The question then is what behavioral characteristic relevant to responsibility
do minors have that would justify a categorical approach and give all kids a break
in the criminal justice system without regard to their individual behavioral
capacities?18 The answer is that those who have not reached majority do not have
the capacity to fully “own” and to fully take responsibility for their individual
mode of recognizing, weighing and responding to reasons.19 The capacity to
“own” takes time. Anyone with fewer than 18 years of experience (or however
many that a polity adopts) hasn’t had enough time to test his reason-responsiveness
against experience. Even minors with seemingly fully developed rational
capacities lack the experience of self necessary for full responsibility. Youth is a
time when we are trying ourselves on for size and deciding what fits and what does
17
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not. Sometimes kids are reflective about this, but most probably are not.
Nonetheless, it is a process that always occurs implicitly or explicitly. In a
profound sense, this process continues throughout life, but youth is when it is most
important. This is not an argument for a character theory of responsibility and
excuse. Like AC, I reject such theories. It is a claim that a certain amount of life
experience is necessary to have the capacity to take responsibility for oneself,
especially time in mid to late adolescence when full formal rational capacities are
achieved. In a similar vein, AC says, “Parents enjoy legal entitlements the
function of which is to entitle them to exert influence over who their children are
and will become….”20 In short, minors are still becoming.
In a certain sense, this is a definitional argument. Full moral agency requires
that people have 18 years of experience because 18 years of experience produces
full moral agency in virtue of permitting people fully to take responsibility for
themselves. In this case, however, I think the circularity is benign rather than
vicious. It is a normative and not empirical claim, although empirical facts about
developmental psychology might well influence the age at which majority is
reached. Of course, at age 18 some people have more “ownership” of themselves
than others, but our polity has simply decided that by age 18, all else being equal,
everyone has enough to be treated as a fully moral agent.
Patricia (Patty) Hearst furnishes a good analogous, intuitive example of the
importance of time in becoming responsible for one’s self. Many will recall that
the 19-year old heiress was kidnapped by a radical group, The Symbionese
Liberation Army (SLA), and “coercively persuaded” while isolated in captivity to
adopt their values, attitude and political agenda. Hearst became a member of the
SLA and assumed the revolutionary name, “Tania.” Not long after becoming
Tania, she eagerly and actively participated in serious criminal behavior, including
armed bank robbery.21 Assume that she was genuinely coercively persuaded, that
it was in no way up to her to become Tania, and that the time between that process
ending and the criminal conduct was very short.22 Tania clearly intentionally
acted, intended the criminal conduct, was not threatened with dire consequences if
she did not participate, and suffered from no mental infirmity. In short, the prima
facie case was airtight and Tania had no affirmative defense of duress or legal
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insanity. Her rationality was fully intact. Nonetheless, did she deserve some break
for her crimes?
If you think Hearst deserves a break, I suggest that the explanation just given
for why we might give all kids a break—the need for sufficient time to pass to test
one’s reasons against experience in order to be fully responsible—does seem
plausible for Hearst. She needed to be in the world as Tania for some amount of
time in order to own being Tania and to become fully responsible. After some
amount of time, she would become fully responsible. We can argue as a normative
matter how much time is necessary, much as a polity might put the age of majority
at a somewhat lower or higher age than 18. Of course kids are “coercively
indoctrinated” by their parents, but they have a great deal of time as they mature in
the world to test themselves, including their modes of reason.
Suppose, like me, you are unpersuaded by the “ownership” argument and do
not want to give either Hearst or Christopher Simmons a break. Is there still a
good TRW argument for giving many kids a break and perhaps almost all of them?
I think individualization based on rational capacity with a break for
underdeveloped rational capacity or diminished rationality would serve well. This
was the approach recommended by the dissent in Roper and the majority in Miller.
This underdeveloped or diminished capacity doctrine would be accompanied by a
strong presumption that it should apply to kids that the prosecution would have to
overcome in presenting its case. This presumption should do much to alleviate the
thorny problem of not giving a break to those kids who really deserve one.
Presumably, the characteristics kids lack should be the same as those we think
adults possess. For example, if impulsivity is a reason why kids should be given a
break, then similar impulsivity in adults should be mitigating also. But I do not
insist on this. Some adherents of TRW believe that there is not a continuum of
rationality between youth and adulthood and that adolescence is a unique
developmental phase. Nonetheless, that phase does not magically always end at
the age of majority and individualization could still be accomplished.
Difficult question for proponents of individualization are how it is to be
accomplished as a practical matter and whether the costs of individuation are worth
it if most kids do deserve a break. Testing the relevant variables would be much
more difficult than, say, testing IQ to determine if a defendant is intellectually
disabled. Commonsense, intuitive judgments are also likely to be unreliable. For
reasons like these, when I proposed a generic “diminished responsibility”
mitigation based on diminished rationality,23 I suggested that the diminishment had
to be quite substantial. Also, these variables are likely to be arrayed along a
23
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continuum at most ages, but I believe we lack the tools to individuate precisely.
Therefore, I also suggested that there be a single class of those deserving
mitigation. In the case of kids, that would presumably be most kids. I am open to
various schemes concerning how much of a break should be given. It could be
uniform or there could be a sliding scale depending on age because older kids
usually have more of the “right stuff.” Because the criminal justice system is
always balancing individual culpability and public protection, another possibility is
an inverse sliding scale, with the size of the break dependent on the seriousness of
the crime.
Individualization is time-consuming and expensive. Is it worth it for kids,
most of whom will probably deserve a break? I think it is because I think some
kids are fully responsible. Christopher Simmons was presumably in this category.
Nevertheless, I would limit individualization to only the most serious crimes that
involve danger to persons, such as homicide, aggravated assault, serious sex
crimes, robbery, and perhaps burglary of homes. These are such morally wrongful
offenses that even kids have the strongest possible reasons, including legal reasons
given the penalties for these crimes, not to offend. If such a kid is fully
responsible, the kid should get the full condign sentence. Judges and juries may be
hesitant to conclude that a particular juvenile defendant accused of serious crime
deserves a break, but the strong presumption of giving one should guide the
inquiry and limit the number of cases in which kids who deserve break are wrongly
denied one. This would be especially true for younger kids. All kids who commit
less serious crimes should be given a break. I include theft in this category
because it is clearly wrong to steal, but the threat of personal injury makes crimes
that do so far more heinous and the need for public safety protection is less
powerful.
Conclusion
AC is a tour de force that must be read by everyone concerned with criminal
culpability in general and by juvenile responsibility in particular. Such a
formidable challenge to TRW deserves the widest possible readership. Even if AC
fails to persuade, its arguments must be questioned and answered by those who
want to offer a principled defense of giving kids a break.
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